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of the opposition’s military strength.3 Therefore, despite a lack of unity among regime
opponents, it may be safe to conclude that there is a potential government-in-waiting, able
to take charge should the Asad regime decide it has had enough.
The regime’s support inside the country is much diminished. Some reports place the
number of Syrian military defectors as in the range of 40,000–60,000 soldiers. Unable to
trust the Sunni majority units, the regime depends on Alawite majority forces. Such units
have been used over and over again all over the country and are tiring and wearing thin:
they are unable to hold territory under their control as demands elsewhere call them off
territory they may recently have seized. For example, the regime has had to pacify Homs
three times, and still the uprising there continues. The same is true in Idlib, Deraa, Hama,
and even rural Damascus.
Syria’s economy and finances are a shambles. Inflation has wiped out savings. Alawites
are preparing for the day of regime collapse by arranging exile or retreat to their mountain
strongholds.4
As the conflict has dragged on, Iran and Hizbollah have intervened, trying to bolster the
regime. The same is true of Russia.5 The regime thus depends on outside support for its
continued life. Its demise would strike a blow at its supporters.
Public debate on Syria seems averse to highlighting these realities of the Syrian conflict.
Almost as if to copy the solution to the Sherlock Holmes mystery—the Silver Blaze6—
where the watchdog did not bark because it was familiar with the criminal, so too the
international community, so familiar over so long a period with Syrian violations of Article
2(4)7 of the UN Charter, does not mention them. Is it fatigue? Is it fear of the consequences
of taking notice? One day, a victim state may conclude that enough is enough. At that point,
one can be sure the international community and international legal community will take
notice. If one believes that enforcing the UN Charter’s most basic principle is essential to
minimum order, one might wish that the international community not wait.
Remarks by Harold Hongju Koh*
It is my honor to speak here again at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law. A year ago, I spoke before this audience about the international legal
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basis for the United States’ military operations in Libya. In that same spirit of openness and
dialogue, I am grateful for the opportunity to engage so many distinguished international
lawyers in this room about the very serious challenges we face in Syria today.
Let me divide my comments this morning into three: First, what, precisely, is happening
in Syria? Second, what are the U.S. government and the international lawyers within it doing
to address the crisis? And third, by what legal principles should this crisis be assessed and
lawfully and effectively addressed?
Starting with the facts on the ground, everyone here knows the situation in Syria is
extremely grave. As President Obama noted earlier this month, ‘‘what’s happening in Syria
is heartbreaking and outrageous. . . . [President Bashar al-Assad] has lost the legitimacy of
his people. And the actions that he’s now taking against his people [are] inexcusable . . . .’’
The Assad regime’s brutality is well-documented and not subject to dispute. As Secretary
Clinton has detailed,
the regime is creating an appalling humanitarian disaster. Tanks, mortars, and heavy
artillery continue to target civilians in residential areas, including women and children.
Security forces have cut off electricity and communications, sabotaged water supplies,
invaded hospitals, and forced thousands of Syrians to flee their homes. The UN has
found crimes against humanity. And now there are reports of troops massing for even
more deadly assaults.1
The Assad regime’s massacre of hundreds of citizens in the city of Homs is only the most
flagrant example of its lawlessness and ruthlessness. The regime seems determined to suppress
democratic dissent through bloodshed. Our best estimates are that the crisis has already
claimed over 9,000 lives and uprooted tens of thousands of Syrians.
Given this alarming snapshot, what should we be doing about it? How can the United
States best respond to the situation in Syria, consistent with domestic and international law
as well as our values and interests? There are no easy answers, and there is no single tool
capable of solving all the problems. The country sits at the hub of a geopolitically sensitive
area, bounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon. Its rulers have had powerful
protectors in Russia and China, as evidenced by their vetoes of not one but two Security
Council resolutions. Syria is home to a complex mix of ethnic and religious communities.
The opposition is still coalescing and faces enormous challenges. People are uncertain about
what comes after Assad. There is no denying that this is an enormously challenging moment
for all of us who are committed to international human rights and to the rule of law.
Many in our government, and in the State Department, have been working around the
clock to evaluate options and facilitate a resolution. President Obama and Secretary Clinton
have devoted themselves to an all-out diplomatic effort to help bring increasing pressure to
bear on the Assad regime. Secretary Clinton led our efforts at the Friends of Syria Conference
in Tunis in February, and has spoken out about the crisis and been engaged behind the scenes
on a daily basis. Ambassador Susan Rice has led our efforts at the United Nations, tirelessly
working to build a unified position. And from the beginning of the crisis, my colleague
Ambassador Robert Ford has displayed extraordinary heroism by risking his own personal
safety to engage directly with the Syrian people, including through his travels to Jassim and
Hama. He has also used social media to establish channels of communication with the Syrian
1 Travel Diary: Secretary Clinton Addresses Friends of Syria Meeting, DipNote (U.S. Dep’t of State Official
Blog) (Feb. 24, 2012), http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/travel_diary_friends_of_syria_tunis/.
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people, encouraging them to embrace nonviolent protest and calling the world’s attention to
the urgency of the human rights and humanitarian situation.
While our efforts have not yet resulted in a resolution to the Syrian crisis, neither have
we stood idly by. To the contrary, the U.S. government, together with our partners, has been
actively pushing on numerous fronts. We have engaged in ceaseless diplomacy in the Security
Council, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Friends of the Syrian People, and
numerous other venues to build international consensus around the Arab League plan and
further isolate the Assad regime. We are providing over $17 million in humanitarian assistance
through the UN and other organizations to support the people of Syria, and we are pursuing
every available avenue to get that assistance to those in need. We have helped the Syrian
opposition prepare to participate in the Syrian-led transition process that the Security Council
has endorsed. We have redoubled our efforts to put financial pressure on those responsible
for human rights abuses in Syria, including through three executive orders in the past year
imposing increasingly severe sanctions. We have sought to ensure that Syrian nationals
present in the United States are not forced to return to unsafe conditions, most notably by
designating Syria for Temporary Protected Status under federal immigration laws. We have
strongly supported the work of the Human Rights Council and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in documenting and publicizing human rights abuses through
the Commission of Inquiry for Syria. And we have begun to discuss issues of accountability
with our Arab and international partners. I am particularly proud of the contributions that
dozens of lawyers from my own office—what we call the ‘‘L-Syria team’’ of the Office of
the Legal Adviser—have made to these efforts.
It is our firm hope that the UN Security Council’s Presidential Statement of last Wednesday,
March 21, will mark a step forward toward a more unified international approach. Like our
regional and global partners, the United States has made clear that Assad must immediately
end his campaign of savagery against his own people, allow humanitarian aid to enter the
country, and make way for a political transition that protects the rights of all Syrians. At
the same time, we have made clear that now is the time for all nations to stand behind these
demands. The Security Council’s statement last week expressed strong support for the six-
point plan put forward by the UN and Arab League Joint Special Envoy and former UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Most critically, the Council echoed Annan’s call for all sides
to end the violence, with the onus on the government to take the first steps. The statement calls
for immediate implementation of a daily pause in hostilities for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and also for political dialogue and the release of detained persons. The statement
further expresses support for a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political
system. And the statement closes by indicating that the Council ‘‘will consider further steps
as appropriate.’’ Without speculating on how exactly events might unfold in the weeks ahead,
I know the administration will constantly assess what is happening inside Syria and adjust
its tactics accordingly.
What international legal principles and other guidelines should govern our actions going
forward? Let me close by suggesting three.
First, we must recognize that the primary responsibility for international peace and security
in the United Nations system continues to rest with the Security Council. Under the UN
Charter, only the Security Council can make certain decisions, such as sanctions determina-
tions, that all UN member states are under a legal obligation to carry out. The General
Assembly has already played a very important role in this crisis, as have regional organizations
such as the Arab League—a role that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter expressly recognizes.
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We both support and applaud the constructive steps that have been taken by the General
Assembly and particularly the Arab League, which has been a leader in seeking to resolve
this crisis. But we will also continue to press ahead in the Security Council to build on the
advances made in the March 21st Presidential Statement, with its unanimous endorsement
of a UN-supervised cessation of violence, humanitarian access to all areas in need, and the
beginning of a Syrian-led political transition.
Second, as international lawyers charged with dealing with complexity, we should avoid
the trap of seeing this dynamic and multifaceted situation in one-dimensional terms. For that
reason, I do not agree with those who insist upon viewing our commitment to solving the
Syrian crisis solely through the lens of military intervention. The international community’s
commitment to solving a problem should not be measured so narrowly. As we have seen
throughout the Arab Awakening, different circumstances call for different responses. In
addressing the Arab Awakening in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and elsewhere, this
administration has carefully and consistently applied a smart power approach to foreign
policy that rejects ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ thinking.
In so saying, we specifically see no inconsistency between the U.S. approach to Syria and
the U.S. approach to Libya. Neither our legal theories, nor our strategic objectives, nor our
moral commitments have changed. What is different are the facts. As President Obama
observed several weeks ago, in Libya we had ‘‘a UN Security Council mandate . . . and we
knew that we could execute very effectively in a relatively short period of time.’’ As difficult
as Libya was, the President added, ‘‘[t]his is a much more complicated situation. . . . [T]he
notion that the way to solve every one of these problems is to deploy our military, that hasn’t
been true in the past and it won’t be true now.’’ With respect to Libya, the Security Council
of course adopted two important resolutions, 1970 and 1973. The proposed Security Council
resolutions on Syria have differed substantially from Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in their
terms. Moreover, from a practical perspective, it is by no means clear that the type of actions
taken to protect Libyan civilians would have the same effect in Syria.
But that does not mean that the international community has turned away from the Syrian
people or ignored the responsibility of the Syrian government to protect its civilian population.
The Syrian government has been condemned for committing human rights violations by the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council; it has been placed under sanctions by
the Arab League, the United States, and the European Union; and it has been the subject of
a searching report by a UN Commission of Inquiry—which found credible evidence that it
has committed crimes against humanity. As I alluded to earlier, the United Nations and the
Arab League appointed Kofi Annan as a Special Envoy to seek both a cessation of hostilities
and political reform. And on Sunday, Secretary Clinton will join the next Friends of Syria
meeting in Istanbul, which will endorse the Syrian opposition’s plan for a peaceful political
transition. I recite this list not to suggest that we are satisfied with where things stand in
Syria: Of course we aren’t. But the principle of a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ vulnerable
civilians, or R2P, itself recognizes the importance of pursuing such options. This list of
actions does give a sense of how—consistent with the principle of R2P—we and our interna-
tional partners have been continually seeking out, developing, and using the tools that are
available to us and appropriate to the situation to advance the protection of the Syrian
population.
Third and finally, a commitment to ensuring that the Assad regime cedes power and a
commitment to denying impunity for gross human rights violations can and should be
maintained simultaneously. Like so many aspects of the situation, this issue is a delicate
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one. But as I have already noted, the United States has strongly encouraged efforts to use
emerging technologies to document and expose human rights abuses in Syria. In addition to
the information that Ambassador Ford has shared on his own Facebook page, the State
Department has set up a dedicated page on the ‘‘Humanrights.gov’’ website where we are
posting satellite imagery of the Syrian Army’s attacks on civilian areas, alongside policy
statements from U.S. officials. We have co-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly
and the Human Rights Council stressing the need for accountability. At the State Department
last week, I met with Paulo Pinheiro, Chair of the UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria,
which has forthrightly stated that crimes against humanity have occurred and that the Syrian
people will need to have a leading voice on issues of accountability. The international
community must continue to work to uncover and tell the truth about what Assad and his
thugs are doing, and ultimately, as Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘there must be accountability
for senior figures of the regime.’’ While it is critical that a political transition occurs, the
anticipation of certain forms of post-transition accountability may help to facilitate that
process—for example, by opening up space for the regime’s opponents and encouraging
defections by those officials who want to distance themselves from its crimes. We think it
of the utmost importance that we work with governments and NGOs alike to continue
documenting human rights violations and collecting evidence to keep shining a light on the
inexcusable actions the Asad regime is taking against its people, and so the international
community can uncover and tell the truth about what is occurring.
In sum, in Syria, like elsewhere in the Middle East during this remarkable Arab Spring,
we do not have the luxury of confronting a simple situation. And neither should we expect
simple answers to such difficult questions. As the organizers of this Annual Meeting have
reminded us in choosing its theme, the central challenge for international lawyers in the 21st
century is ‘‘confronting complexity.’’ What that means—in this and every setting that modern
international lawyers face—is avoiding simplistic analogies and short-sighted solutions in
favor of thoughtful, nuanced approaches that might deliver lawful and durable solutions to
complex global problems.
The United Nations and Syria: A Work in Progress?
By Steven Mathias*
As the crisis in Syria continues, and in the context in which the Security Council, as of
the time of this panel being convened, has issued two Presidential Statements on the subject
but failed to adopt two resolutions because of non-concurring votes of certain Permanent
Members, it may be best to begin by noting that the United Nations, taking into account all
of its parts, has in fact been active from an early date in seeking to address the Syrian crisis.
In March 2011, the Secretary-General urged the Syrian authorities to refrain from violence
and called on the government in Syria to listen to the legitimate aspirations of the people
and address them through inclusive political dialogue and genuine reforms.1 Throughout the
crisis, the Secretary-General has on various occasions also called for the protection of civilians
in Syria, the need for humanitarian access, and the release of political prisoners. The Secretary-
General has also engaged in dialogue with the President of Syria to encourage him to end
* Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, United Nations.
1 The statement of March 18, 2011, is attributable to the spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Syria.
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.238 on Thu, 13 Mar 2014 01:44:41 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
